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Law and the Financial Crisis: Searching for Europe’s New Gold Standard 
 
 
 
Introduction – The Role of Law in the Economics of the Eurozone 
 
‘[T]he European Union is a community of law, subscribed to by the Member 
States in which pacta sunt servanda. This refers to all the pacts, starting from 
fiscal discipline in the Member States to the commitment of the Member 
States to pay their debts…The euro…is about respect for the law.’1 
 
The role of law in the economic crisis engulfing Europe is ambiguous. In 
European scholarship, law is often portrayed as having been a crucial driver 
towards integration, providing powerful individual rights to access markets. 
The European Union had established a quasi-constitutional legal framework 
that took traditional inter-state trade politics out of economics to be replaced 
by the certainty of law and legal procedures. The crowning legal achievement, 
the single currency, was supposed to operate in a similar manner, with 
automatic corrective legal procedures ensuring fiscal discipline and a prudent 
central bank mandated to control inflation. With this solid legal framework, 
competitive open markets were supposed to deliver stability and growth. 
Thus, in theory, the crisis should not have happened at all.  
During the crisis, the limits of the established legal framework have 
become a source of contention. Given the cataclysmic implications of failure, 
it is surprising, even surreal, how often debate has focused upon the issue of 
whether the EU institutions are acting unlawfully.2 The EU has thus resembled 
a fire-fighter who, at the scene of a blaze threatening to engulf a 
neighbourhood, worries she cannot extract water from a nearby house without 
the owner’s permission. The Maastricht treaty has indeed appeared at times 
to be a suicide pact. In reality, of course, arguments about the proper scope of 
the Eurozone’s legal powers are far from legalistic: underlying them are 
profound differences over the economic causes and appropriate resolution of 
the crisis. The question of what the EU may legally do has become entangled 
with that of what it should do. This paper explores the role of law in the crisis 
and its relationship to the underlying economic and political debates.  
It is widely agreed now that the crisis has revealed that the legal order 
of the single currency created unsustainable imbalances. Economic evidence 
shows that under-regulated capital markets in Europe reflected global trends 
toward excessive risk-taking. These capital flows were the necessary counter-
parts to huge trade imbalances and asset bubbles within Europe from 2000-7 
                                                 
1
 Intervention by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, Deputy-President, European Central Bank, ECON Committee 
Hearing on “Improving the economic governance and stability framework of the Union, in particular in 
the euro area,” Brussels, 15 September 2010.  
2
 See M Ruffert, ‘The European Debt Crisis and European Union Law’ (2011) 48 CMLRev 1777-1806 
for an analysis which reveals the tension between law and resolving the crisis. He criticises the strategy 
adopted to tackle the crisis concluding that there ‘are good reasons to submit that this policy is in 
breach of important provision of the TFEU’ (785) arguing that this undermines the principle that ‘[t]the 
European Union is a Union based on the rule of law, not of power (claimed by whomsoever), and this 
must also hold in times of distress.’ At the same time he offers no plausible alternative economic 
solutions, either within or without the legal framework of Maastricht, to the crisis that faced the 
Eurozone in 2010-12. This suggests that Maastricht was indeed a constitutional ‘suicide pact’.  
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that have since dramatically reversed.3  The subsequent collapse in asset 
prices, banking sectors and economic activity felt in the deficit countries has 
created public spending crises there. With the flight to safety, a sovereign 
debt panic was allowed to spread across Europe in 2010-11.  The Maastricht 
framework was never designed to provide large-scale fiscal support to 
Member States and the political response of the Eurozone has been piece-
meal and confused. Nevertheless, massive amounts of support have been 
marshaled, particularly through the ECB.4 This has prompted growing concern 
about both the economic costs and the legal or political basis for such 
transfers. 
In interpreting these events there is a powerful strand of German 
economic thinking, derived from the Hayekian and ordo- liberal schools, that 
argues that law is critical to resolving the crisis, in particular, by reaffirming the 
rules on fiscal and monetary discipline.5  Failure by Member States, and 
latterly the ECB, to adhere to these rules is viewed as both legally illegitimate, 
a breach of the spirit of the Maastricht treaty and, above all, economically 
dangerous.6 A renewed assertion of the Maastricht European economic 
constitution is thus central to allow market prices to adjust and rebalance the 
economy.7By contrast, Keynesians suggest that fiscal indiscipline was not a 
key cause of the crisis. Austerity imposed by law is doomed to fail, both 
politically and economically.   The powerful Member States, however, largely 
share the liberal economic assessment and have been politically unwilling to 
commit adequate funds. The crisis has thus repeatedly resurfaced, leaving 
the European System of Central Banks to assume a crucial, but legally and 
economically contentious, role in preventing a break-up of the single currency.     
The ultimate ‘grundnorm’ of the single currency has been thrown into 
doubt, both in terms of economic theory and legal design. The original price 
stability norm, inscribed into the Maastricht design by Germany, was 
successfully achieved. 8 Liberal economists now argue however that the vast 
liquidity provided by the ECB to the periphery both creates an illegitimate 
transfer union and impedes the process of economic adjustment necessary to 
restore stability. Legal limits upon money creation are necessary to allow price 
and wage flexibility and eliminate moral hazard on the part of governments. 
On this view, what is needed is more law and less discretion to prop up weak 
                                                 
3
 See S Barnes, ‘Resolving and Avoiding Unsustainable Imbalances in the Euro Area’ (2010) OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers, No.827. 
4
 The sources of direct support include bilateral aid and pledges to the EFSM, EFSF and the ESM 
which when combined could reach  €800 billion. These have so far been drawn upon by Ireland, 
Portugal and Greece. More significant are the indirect funds from the ECB which include €1.2  trillion 
in LTRO funds, €200 billion in SMP funds and the TARGET2 account deficits of around €800 billion. 
5
 For a good overview of the development and basis of ordo-liberal thought and see D Gerber, Law and 
Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (1998) Oxford University Press, 
Ch.7. 
6
  For a good range of influential German economists see the debate in the papers collected in the 
CESifo Forum 2012. Accesible at http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/ifoHome/b-
publ/b2journal/30publforum/_PUBLFORUM12 
7
 For a detailed discussion of the influence of German ordo-liberalism upon the interpretation of the 
European treaties see W Sauter, ‘ The Economic Constitution of  the European Union’ (1998) 4 Colum. 
J Eur L 27 at 43-56. 
8
 M Herdegen, ‘Price Stability and Budgetary Restraints in the Economic and Monetary Union: the 
Law as Guardian of Economic Wisdom’ (1998) 35 CML Rev 19 describes price stability as ‘a 
fundamental norm in a meta-constitutional sense’, 21. 
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economic actors and governments, even if this may involve default or exit 
from the single currency in some cases. There is as yet no serious 
consideration of moving closer towards deeper political union as a basic norm  
The fear of a financial disaster being triggered by the default or exit of a 
Eurozone member is however such that powerful Member States have been 
unwilling to re-commit to a market-based order. Present polices are a 
compromise in which structural reform and recession are imposed alongside 
conditional transfers and large amounts of central bank money creation. 
Political leaders, whilst constrained by domestic concerns, have perhaps also 
decided that the crisis may be a means of overcoming long-standing 
obstacles to reform within Europe.9 Centrifugal forces are however constantly 
threatening to overwhelm centripetal dynamics: austerity may prompt default, 
exit and devaluation by debtor nationals, whilst the burden of bail-outs and 
currency debauchment may prompt creditors to form a breakaway monetary 
union. The search for a new stable European legal order will entail a period of 
huge instability in which law is replaced by power politics as creditors, 
including the ECB, seek to restructure debtor nations outside the legal 
framework of a full political union.  The nations that survive this process may 
then find themselves part of a group of core countries who are permitted the 
option of going further with deeper shared fiscal institutions and common debt 
issuance. 
  
Credibility, Co-operation and the End of Classical Gold Standard 
 
 The Eurozone crisis contains strong echoes of the challenges and 
debates surrounding the gold standard during the period 1928-36. That period 
also saw strong legal commitments (at national level) towards fixed exchange 
rates backed by gold that eventually collapsed under political and economic 
pressure. This epoch also witnessed the first real economic debates between 
the new Keynesian ideas and those of classical liberalism. The former argued 
for loosening monetary and fiscal policy to stimulate demand, whilst the 
liberalism articulated by Hayek and Von Mises contended that normal 
business cycles must be allowed to adjust prices and wages downwards.10  
Eichengreen, in his classic account of the period, argues that the stability of 
the gold standard during its pre-World War One heyday rested upon twin 
props of credibility and international co-operation.11 This credibility, whilst 
based partly on legislation, derived most its force from an unwavering 
commitment of central banks and governments to impose serious austerity 
upon the population. The ‘rules of the game’ entailed that wages and 
                                                 
9
 ‘the crisis represents an opportunity....Europe always moved forward in times of crisis. Sometimes 
you need a little pressure for certain decisions to be taken.’ Wolfgang Schäuble, German finance 
minister, cited in Reuters, 14th December 2011. 
10
 See FA Hayek, Contra Keynes and Cambridge: the Collected Works of FA Hayek (ed.) B Caldwell, 
1995, London, Routledge. Keynes was, of course, not the only critic of classical liberal approaches to 
the depression. See BJ McCormick, Hayek and the Keynesian Avalanche, (1992) New York, Harvester 
Wheatsheaf for a detailed review of the debates. For a comparison of the links between Hayek and the 
ordoliberal school see F Bonker and H-J Wagener,’Hayek and Eucken on the State and Market 
Economy’ in A Labrousse and J-D Weisz (eds.) Institutional Economics in France and Germany: 
German Ordoliberalism versus the French Regulation School, 2001, Springer, Berlin.  
11
 B Eichengreen, Golden Fetters: the Gold Standard and the Great Depression 1919-1939, (1995) 
Oxford University Press. 
 4 
employment be allowed to fall to correct balance of payments deficits. So 
strong was this political fact that private capital flowed towards countries with 
trade deficits in the knowledge that central banks would raise interest rates. 
The system was self-correcting. After World War One, this credibility began to 
erode with the rise of social democracy and its commitment to protect 
employment and welfare.  
 This left the second prop of international co-operation as critical: only if 
major central banks were willing to constantly adjust monetary policy to help 
struggling countries could imbalances be resolved. Thus surplus countries 
had to inflate by lowering rates in order to draw in imports from those in 
deficit. This level of co-operation was rarely achieved after 1918, despite 
severe trade and capital imbalances arising from European reconstruction. 
The United States Federal Reserve, increasingly the most important central 
bank in the system, was focused upon the domestic economy and did not co-
operate to secure the gold standard. Instead, trade in real goods and services 
became unbalanced with the US running large trade surpluses; only 
continued short-term US capital flows could stop balance of payments crises 
draining gold from deficit countries in Europe. 12  
The banking crisis in 1929-31 saw this capital dry up, leaving countries 
with the choice of severe austerity to stay on the gold standard or quitting the 
system and devaluing their currencies. Gradually countries left gold after 
serious austerity had failed to attract new capital flows. Countries leaving the 
gold standard imposed capital controls to stabilize currencies. Some were 
able thus to increase exports but, more importantly, leaving gold allowed them 
to relax domestic credit constraints and reduce interest rates. Domestic 
demand was stimulated. Those staying on gold, particularly France and 
America retaliated against devaluation with tariffs on cheaper imports. Thus 
there was a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ spiral leading to a break-down in 
international co-operation and free trade, which greatly worsened the 
economic hardships that had originated in a United States’ domestic down-
turn.  
PolyaniPolanyi, in his critique of the period leading to the Great 
Depression, argued that the end of the gold standard represented the failure 
of orthodox liberal economics.13  The gold standard was the final element in a 
free market system. The central bank’s main role was to protect the currency 
from debasement. Continued confidence in the central bank depended 
however upon balanced budgets to avoid monetarising debt. The classical 
liberal view, shared by Hayek, and followed by the ordo-liberals, was that 
governments should not intervene against the corrective forces of the market. 
‘[Q]uestions of social organisation had to be wholly subordinated to the needs 
of the restoration of the currency. Deflation was the primary need; domestic 
institutions had to adjust as best they might.’14 PolyaniPolanyi argued that far 
from being self-regulating and stable, gold standard economics imposed such 
hardships upon the population that they were incompatible with, not just 
economic and social life, but liberal democracy itself. He criticised the 
‘stubbornness with which economic liberals…in the service of deflationary 
                                                 
12
 Above at 21. 
13
 K PolyaniPolanyi, The Great Transformation: the Political and Economic Origins of our Time, 
(2001) Boston, Beacon Press Books. 
14
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policies, supported authoritarian interventionism’ during the 1920s.15 The 
severe adjustments required of the population in terms of wages and 
employment were eventually rejected; instead state intervention including 
credit creation, exchange controls, tariffs, debt default and public spending 
where used to protect people from the market and gold was abandoned. 
Substituting current Northern European trade surplus countries for the 
role of the United States during the Great Depression, the current crisis in the 
Eurozone raises similar questions of co-operation and credibility.16 What was 
initially seen as a global economic shock driven by private sector excess, has 
mutated into a European game of recrimination about ‘profligate’ nations. The 
Eurozone Member States have thus been unable to co-operate to provide 
large-scale transfers of funds or growth to mitigate deep recessions in the 
periphery. Instead, they have simply deepened their legal commitment to 
austerity in an effort to make it more credible. Countries in recession were on 
their own aside from access to highly conditional loans. This failed to convince 
financial markets to re-invest in such countries. 
As we shall see, in the absence of adequate action by Eurozone 
members, the European System of Central Banks, whose Governing Council 
operates by majority voting on monetary policy, provided the necessary co-
operation among central banks. The Eurozone banking systems have 
therefore had unlimited liquidity to avoid bankruptcy and their governments 
have not had to underwrite large-scale banking failures yet.17  Peripheral 
Member States with trade deficits have still been able to import goods and 
services. Under the single currency, unlike the gold standard, countries are 
like regions within a state and cannot be allowed to literally ‘run out of money’. 
This was always implicit in the legal framework of Maastricht but only when 
the crisis struck did its true significance become clear. Real ‘solidarity’ within 
the Eurozone has come in the unlikely shape of the central bankers meeting 
every month in Frankfurt. These opaque transfers via the ESCB are however 
being increasingly questioned on legal, political and economic grounds in core 
countries, just as stringent austerity is questioned as a legal and economic 
necessity in peripheral countries. 
 
From Single Market to Single Currency: Learning Only Some Lessons from 
the Great Depression 
 
In standard discussion about the origins of the Common Market, reference is 
usually made to the links between this collapse in world trade caused by 
protectionism in the 1930s and the subsequent world war. Europe was said to 
have learned the lessons and so the Treaty of Rome contained strong legal 
prohibitions on tariffs and quotas. These legal commitments have become 
firmly established over 50 years. 18 The unquestioned ‘economic constitution’ 
                                                 
15
 243 
16
 For a good summary see  European Commission, (2009) ‘Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, 
Consequences and Responses’, European Economy 7/2009, DG Economic and Financial Affairs. 
17
 The Irish government was the first Eurozone government to recapitalise its banks on a large scale 
following their realisation of huge losses on property loans. There remain however grave doubts about 
the banking sectors in Greece and Spain where property loans have also failed. Private lending to such 
banks will remain constrained until the losses are realised and banks recapitalised. 
18
 They were eventually extended to include prohibitions on capital controls, thus removing a key tool 
of balance of payments policy.  Council Directive 88/361 [1988] OJ L178/5. 
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of the EU, they form the core of legally enforceable market rights. Whilst the 
benefits of open markets in goods and services are widely agreed upon by 
economists, the move to a single currency presented the more challenging 
problem of regulating trade imbalances, the same challenges that led to the 
collapse of the gold standard. 
Before the Euro, in a world without the gold standard or fixed exchange 
rates, currency flexibility was a crucial shock absorber. Devaluations enabled 
countries to eliminate trade deficits by making their goods more competitive 
but also accommodated inflation. Some of the underlying problems damaging 
competiveness like interest group rivalry and monetarisation of public debt, 
were not resolved.  Italian and French elites wished to change their internal 
political economy by creating more credible commitments to curb inflationary 
expectations. The Bundesbank had the best inflation control in Europe. In 
1979, the European Monetary System (‘EMS’) therefore saw the major 
economies anchor their currencies to the Deutschmark. Interest rates had to 
rise to very high levels to maintain parities.19 Just like the inter-war gold 
standard, EMS proved unstable because (a) deficit countries would not 
impose unlimited austerity and (b) surplus countries would not provide 
unlimited credit. This meant the EMS was a persistent target for speculators. 
The move to a legally ‘irrevocable’ single currency was seen as a way of 
eliminating speculation through establishing greater credibility with markets 
and internal economic actors. The present crisis has revealed however that, 
whilst suppressed for a time by ‘irrevocable’ legal ties, speculation can re-
emerge within a single currency in markets for sovereign debts.20  
In the economic literature, the cost/benefits of moving to a European 
single currency were in debated in narrow terms relating to which Member 
States together might make up an ‘optimal currency area.’ 21 22 Most 
economists agreed that only a core group of Northern Member States were 
                                                 
19
 See Mundell’s famous impossibility triangle whereby a state can have two out of three of the 
following: fixed exchange rates, free movement of capital and monetary autonomy. It must surrender 
one to achieve the other two. RA Mundell (1963). "Capital mobility and Stabilization Policy under 
Fixed and Flexible exchange rates". Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science 29 (4): 475–
485 
20
 See PM Garber, ‘Notes on the role of Target in a Stage III Crisis’ Working Paper 6619, NBER, June 
1998 who argued that speculators could seek to test the degree of commitment to the single currency 
by moving funds out of high-inflation countries to those with low-inflation. This would force surplus 
country central banks to fund deficit countries in an unlimited sum, a commitment that they might not 
be prepared to honour. 
21
 F Snyder, ‘EMU Revisited: Are we making a constitution? What constitution are we making?’ in P 
Craig and G de Burca, The Evolution of EU Law, 1999, Oxford University Press. 
22
 Mundell had famously argued that currency union between nations could only be justified on 
economic grounds when the countries involved shared key characteristics, particularly high levels of 
cross-border labour mobility. R Mundell, ‘A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas’ (1961) American 
Economic Rev 51.Mundell argued that other important factors  pointing against currency union were if 
economic shocks to members tended to be asymmetric, if members were large and if there were no 
fiscal co-ordination between them.  See also J Meade, ‘The Balance-of-Payments Problems of a 
European Free-Trade Area’ (1957) Economic Journal 379 who argued that flexible exchanges rates 
were necessary in the absence of political union. Goodhart however argues that there is no evidence 
that real nations or federations conform to the theory of optimal currency areas and yet they subsist. 
CAE Goodhart, ‘The Political Economy of Monetary Union’ in P Kenen (ed) Understanding 
Interdependence. The Macroeconomics of the Open Economy. (1995) Princeton University Press. 
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sufficiently similar in economic terms.23 It was argued that more inflation-
prone peripheral nations of Southern Europe were more suited to a separate 
currency area with a lower exchange rate. 24 The economists’ concern was 
that, with wages inflexible and migration limited,  a wide Eurozone would see 
competitiveness eroded in the periphery; trade deficits would develop.  With 
fixed currencies, only sudden, and politically difficult, austerity measures to 
push down wages and consumption could correct such deficits.  
Whilst political factors of course dominated in the decision to widen 
participation in the Euro to include the periphery,25 the European Commission 
had argued that capital markets would regulate trade deficits automatically. 
The single currency would act like a new classical gold standard; with the 
private sector convinced that exchange rates were locked irreversibly, lending 
could flow based only credit risk. Integrated and open capital markets could 
perform the shock-absorber role formerly left to the exchange rate, assuming 
that markets could price risk properly.26 In fact, because of the European 
Central Bank, Eurozone member banks could never run out of liquidity to 
finance cross-border trade. The balance of payments would become as 
invisible and irrelevant as transfers between banks in London and 
Manchester. The Maastricht Treaty therefore only made provision for balance 
of payments support for non-Eurozone members of the EU.27 
  
The First EU ‘Gold Standard’: the Life and Near-Death of the Original Stability 
and Growth Pact 
 
Given the current deflationary bias in the world economy, it is easy to forget 
that it was the inflationary 1970s that really shaped economic thinking around 
the single currency. Germany, whilst keen to achieve currency stability to 
protect  demand for her exports, had always favoured a deeper form of 
political union, with direct EU control over economic policy to prevent inflation. 
28
 As is well known, the Delors report eventually concluded that the single 
currency could be stable without political union so long as two key elements 
were adopted - an independent central bank with a strict price stability target 
                                                 
23
 B Eichengreen, ‘Is Europe an Optimal Currency Area?’ B Eichengreen, (1997) European Monetary 
Unification: Theory, Practice and Analysis, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
24
 T Bayoumi and B Eichengreen,’Ever closer to heaven? An Optimum-Currency-Area Index for 
European Countries’ (1997) 41(3-5) European Economic Review 761-70. 
25
 See L Tsoukalis, ‘EMU: the Primacy of High Politics’ in W Wallace and W Walton (eds.) 
Policymaking in the EU, (3rd ed.) Oxofrd Univesrity Press, 279-99. 
26
 European Commission, (1990) ‘One money, one market: an evaluation of the potential benefits and 
costs of forming an economic and monetary union’ European Economy 44, 162. ‘The conclusion is, 
therefore, that the complete liberalization of capital flows and the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates 
or a single currency would imply that the disappearance of the intra-Community external constraint 
would be at least partially a substitute for nominal exchange rate adjustment in EMU.’ 
27
 TFEU Art 143. 
28
 E R Staal, ‘European Monetary Union: the German Political-Economic Trilemma’, (1999) ZEI 
Discussion Paper, C45.  The debates had coalesced around ‘monetarists’ who argued that exchange rate 
stability would in itself help to reduce inflation in high-inflation countries and the ‘economist’ school 
who argued that real economic convergence was necessary first otherwise exchange rate stability 
would simply lead to inflation being exported from, for example, France to Germany. The debate was 
resolved by agreement to ensure both price and exchange rate stability under the Euro. 
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and fiscal convergence. Germany agreed to monetary union on this basis 
despite its misgivings.29 
Certainly combatting inflation, not fear of spill-overs from sovereign 
debt defaults, was the main driver behind the legal limits on public debt 
agreed at Maastricht. Article 121 TFEU nevertheless made clear that neither 
the EU nor the Member States would assume legal liability for the debts of 
any of the other Member States. Before the current crisis of sovereign default 
risk, the most obvious fear was that Member States might use public deficits 
to reduce unemployment and thereby raise inflation. The credibility of the ECB 
might be undermined if interest rates had to rise to intolerable levels to 
combat inflationary forces.30  In the run-up to monetary union there was 
significant progress in achieving convergence in average deficit levels down 
from 5% to 2% GDP between 1992 to 1998. The average stock of public debt 
increased to 73.2% but this was sustainable so long as economic growth 
continued.31  
Maastricht confirmed this duty: Member States ‘shall avoid excessive 
budget deficits.’32 It also set out the surveillance procedure whereby the 
Commission should monitor the budgetary situation in order to identify ‘gross 
errors’ in non-compliance with the reference values for the stock of public debt 
and the annual deficit. These were set at 60% of GDP and 3% of GDP per 
annum respectively.33  These commitments towards ‘sound public finances’ 
were expressions of the German ordo-liberal design of Maastricht. There was 
no power to engage in Keynesian-style demand management at EU level.34 
Delinquent Member States were to be reported to the Council by the 
Commission. 35 In the end the Council had the ultimate power to decide on 
whether there had been a breach, whether to make private recommendations 
or to make these public and, ultimately, to impose financial sanctions.36 The 
                                                 
29
 J Delors, Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community (1989) Committee 
for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, Luxembourg: Office of Official Publications of the 
European Communities. J Pisani-Ferry, ‘Only One Bed for Two Dreams: A Critical Retrospective on 
the Debate over the Economic Governance of the Euro Area’ (2006) 44(4) JCMS 823-44 for a 
discussion of the debates. 
30
 MJ Artis and B Winkler, ‘The Stability Pact: Safeguarding the Credibility of the European Central 
Bank,’ (1998) National Institute Economic Review, January 87-98. MJ Artis and B Winkler, ‘The 
Stability Pact: trading off flexibility for credibility?’ in A Hughes-Hallett, MM Hutchinson and SE 
Hougaard Jensen (eds.), Fiscal Aspects of European Monetary Integration, Cambridge University 
Press, 1999. There were some who argued that only a clear commitment to an independent ECB with a 
commitment to monetary policy to convince financial markets.   T Padoa-Schioppa, The Road to 
Monetary Union in Europe: the emperor, the kings and the genies. 2000, Oxford University Press. 
‘There are no compelling arguments that a common monetary policy also requires a common fiscal 
policy or a major shift in decision-making power from national to Community authorities.’ 159  
31
 See M Larch, P van den Noord, L Jonung, ‘The Stability and Growth Pact: Lessons from the Great 
Recession’ European Economy Economic Papers, 429/2010, DG Ecofin, European Commission. 
32
 Art 126 Treaty on the Function of the EU 
33
 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of 
budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies.  See also TFEU 
Protocol No. 12 on the excessive deficit procedure. 
34
 K Dyson and K Featherstone, The Road of Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union, 
(1999) Oxford University Press, 382. 
35
 There was an area of discretion in the Commission such that deviations that were due to temporary 
emergencies or were moving readily towards the reference values could be ignored. 
36
 Art 126(3)-(13) 
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‘automaticity’ of procedures and penalties was one German demand that was 
removed in the final draft. 
As is well-known, in practice the legal limits upon deficits were not 
enforced rigorously. The Commission took annulment proceedings after the 
Council refused to act against France and Germany. The European Court 
ruled that there was no power to put the procedure into abeyance and that, in 
the absence of a new recommendation from the Commission, the Council 
must take further steps to compel deficit reduction.37 The Council did not obey 
the Court’s order and instead the procedure itself was modified to allow states 
with excessive deficits to avoid further legal action where the economic 
conditions justified this.38 The amendments mean that the SGP was no 
longer, even purportedly, a legally-binding rule but rather a politically 
negotiated and discretionary process.   
The original SGP lacked credibility. The target values proved to be too 
inflexible in the face of recession in the two leading Eurozone powers. 
Germany, now so successful, had been struggling for years with slow growth 
and unemployment arising from reunification. Law here proved to be 
secondary to domestic political and economic concerns.39 In fact, whilst long-
term debt sustainability is a critical economic goal, the SGP design did not 
address this.40 There was no system for coordinating fiscal policy in the 
different Member States to ensure each contributed to balanced and 
sustainable growth. 41 A Member State facing an ‘asymmetric’ shock could not 
expect to receive help from other Eurozone countries or the ECB to raise 
aggregate demand.42  This lack of true fiscal union meant that ‘excessive’ 
budget deficits were inevitable if reasonable growth and employment levels 
were to be maintained. For some Member States, like Greece, however 
deficits were an expression of a structural inability to properly resolve 
economic conflicts and manage its finances.43 
 
Trends in the Eurozone Before the Crisis: Single Currency Credibility Drives 
Risk and Market Imbalances  
 
                                                 
37
 C-27/04 Commission v Council of the European Union, Judgement of 13 July 2004.  
38
 Council Regulation 1056/2005 amending Regulation 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive debt procedure. See Presidency Conclusions, European Council, 23 
March 2005, 7619/1/05 REV 1. The changes allowed ‘cyclical’ deficits caused by recessions to persist; 
‘structural’ deficits were now the target of legal actions. There was room of huge disagreement upon 
the meaning of this term. 
39
 See W Schelkle, ‘EU Fiscal Governance: Hard Law in the Shadow of Soft Law?’ [2007] 13 Col. J. 
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The period from the launch of EMU until 2007 appeared to be a 
success: there was convergence in incomes between poorer and richer 
Member States. There was no need for deeper fiscal union after all.44 The 
flow of short-term capital around Europe suggested that markets had 
accepted the credibility of countries’ legal commitments to the Euro. 
Exchange rate risk was removed. Beyond this however, markets seemed to 
pricing in an implicit commitment by core countries that, regardless of the 
Maastricht text, no sovereign default would be allowed by any Eurozone 
member. The most obvious manifestation of this level of belief was the fall in 
the yield on government debts in Southern Europe: the spread over German 
bunds (viewed as the benchmark safe asset) fell to historic lows.45 Countries 
were able to borrow much more cheaply. Deficits and debts could be bigger. 
Relative risks between sovereigns however should have remained a concern; 
the launch of EMU did not see any general convergence in debt/GDP ratios.46  
Economically, the pre-crisis fiscal picture was mixed: fast growing economies, 
such as Ireland (48.3% GDP to 25% GDP) and Spain (62.3% GDP to 
36.1%GDP) used the fruits of growth to lower their stock of debt over the 
period 1999-2007. Even Greece could support its high level of debt (94% to 
107%) and fund persistent deficits. With growth rates over 7% p.a. and 
historically low interest rates, capital markets lent freely to such countries. 
Member States with slower growth were vulnerable for different reasons. 
Portugal (49.6% to 68.3% GDP) had low savings and relied on foreign 
investors. Italy (113.7% to 103.6% GDP) had high savings but a very high 
debt burden. Both turned out to be vulnerable financial panic spreading from 
weaker states. 
Trade and capital imbalances were exacerbated by monetary union. 
Countries with high savings and low wage growth, particularly Germany, 
Netherlands and Finland ran 5% GDP trade surpluses. Banks, unable to find 
investment outlets at home, recycled this money towards peripheral countries, 
particularly Spain, Greece and Portugal, allowing them to run trade deficits of 
7% of GDP.47 There was no ‘currency’ to defend and so no pressure on the 
periphery to reduce imports and raise exports. The trade imbalances between 
countries of the Eurozone were treated as irrelevant. Surplus countries found 
ready markets and recycled capital flows allowed peripheral consumers to 
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enjoy higher wages, consumption and asset windfalls.48 The Commission had 
already noted, however, in its pre-EMU assessment of the prospects for the 
single currency that ‘the only remaining limitation in EMU consists in a long-
run solvency constraint of companies, households and governments. The 
current account may for a long time be in disequilibrium as long as there is the 
expectation that in the end the foreign debt will be repaid…’49 The private 
capital markets were thus to be the sole discipline on trade imbalances.  
Improving or even sustaining competitiveness in the periphery was not 
seen as a matter for intervention by the European Commission. Capital, 
product and service markets were of course subject to further liberalisation 
efforts during this period. There was however no country specific policy of 
enforcement to open up the closed professions or attack restrictive practices 
and inefficient state enterprises. Enforcement remained ostensibly neutral, 
avoiding any attempt to target rising unit labour cost rises and improve 
competitiveness in the deficit countries. The developing jurisprudence of the 
single market regarding ‘market access’ could have provided a legal basis 
upon which to remove many of the worst regulatory restrictions and special 
interest protections that have been put under the spot-light since the crisis 
erupted.50 Even then, the surpluses might have persisted and capital markets 
would have likely recycled these towards bad investments. The Commission’s 
own post-crisis assessment concluded that asset price bubbles in Ireland, 
Spain and the Baltic helped to raise nominal prices and wages there but did 
not themselves cause the trade imbalances. They merely were consequence 
of the capital markets misallocation of resources toward uses that did not 
improve productivity, above all, into property speculation.51 
 
From Private to Sovereign Debt Crisis: Constructing Rescue Funds Amid a 
Fear of Disorderly Default 
 
When the credit crisis first struck in 2007-8 it was confined to private 
capital markets. Initially there was thus no existential threat to the Maastricht 
framework: although the Stability and Growth Pact constraints were breached 
- as government debt increased to make up for shortfalls in private spending 
and to recapitalize banks - the sovereign debt market remained stable.  The 
crisis first spread to the fiscal side in early 2010 when Greece failed to 
convince capital markets that its debt was sustainable after it revealed a much 
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higher deficit than previously published. 52 Greece suddenly found that it could 
only either borrow at prohibitive rates or impose politically impossible levels of 
cuts in GDP.53 The fact that even the data provided by a Member State could 
not be trusted dealt the ‘law’ on fiscal discipline a body blow. The Eurozone 
could in principle have left Greece to default: there was no legal prohibition on 
sovereign default nor did the Treaty give powers or mechanism to support 
either liquidity or longer-term finance for sovereigns.  
Significantly however, despite the apparently totemic status of the ‘no 
bail-out’ principle of Maastricht,  the Council immediately decided to establish 
a permanent fund ready to prevent contagion and meet looming problems 
elsewhere in the Eurozone. Support for general public spending was not 
directly contemplated by the Treaty: only Article 122 (3) provided some legal 
basis for transfers where ‘a Member State is in difficulties or is seriously 
threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional 
occurrences beyond its control.’ The creation of the immediate temporary 
European Financial Stability Mechanism funded with €60 billion, secured 
against the EU budget, was based upon this provision.54 The Greek fiscal 
crisis was clearly a result of Greek economic mismanagement over a long 
period upon which the general crisis was overlaid. A provision designed to 
cover earthquakes and hurricanes was a doubtful basis for a permanent 
stability fund given the clear understanding of the Maastricht settlement. At 
the same time Eurozone members agreed to create a private company, the 
European Financial Stability Facility, endowed with guarantees against up to 
€440 billion in fresh loans.55 Its funding still had to be approved by national 
parliaments. The actual funds provided for Greece had to be initially made 
outside the framework of EU law altogether through bilateral loans.56 Given 
the emergency, approval was pushed though at national level but there 
remained doubts about the legal compatibility of the EFSF and the EFSF with 
the Maastricht ‘no bail-out’ rule.57  If a recipient of loans from EFSF or EFSM 
defaulted then that would amount to an illegitimate (in terms of Maastricht) 
fiscal transfer rather than a commercial loan.  
Why did the EU arrange the initial Greek bail-out given Greece’s 
dreadful track record on fiscal matters? The answer may seem obvious: to 
keep the single currency together.  This said, it is not certain that a default 
would have seen Greece choose to leave the single currency. Exit would deny 
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Greek banks access to the ECB and lead to bank failures. The Greek 
government could have legally written it off its debt as it was mostly governed 
by Greek law. The real reason arose from fear of sparking another Lehman 
Brothers-style credit event. With Eurozone banks still fragile, default by even 
small peripheral country with a fixed stock of debts held in identifiable 
institutions, was seen as potentially such an event. The financial crisis had 
shown that capital markets were both too interconnected and too indebted for 
the Maastricht prohibition on bail-outs to withstand events. The Greek bail-out 
can thus be put down to Eurozone leaders’ fear of financial markets rather 
than any notion of European solidarity.  Since that time, the on-going problem 
within the Eurozone has been when and how to allow normal market forces to 
apply again in financial markets. This has been made more complex because  
the fate of sovereigns and their private banks have become entwined. 
 The hope that Greece was an isolated and containable case proved 
unfounded however as in November 2010, Ireland and, subsequently, in May 
2011, Portugal, both required support from the European Financial Stability 
Mechanism acting in conjunction with the ECB and IMF.   
 
The European Central Bank – an Unlikely Saviour? 
 
The European Central Bank has come to be the key actor during the crisis. 
This is for three reasons:  first, it is relatively immune from political or legal 
challenges to its decisions; second, core Member States, unable to agree 
openly on large scale transfers to peripheral states, were content to allow the 
ECB to provide funds that did not feature in their national debt figures and 
third, its legal remit has turned out to be rather more flexible than previously 
imagined.  
It was not supposed to be this way. The primary duty on the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB) comprising the ECB and the national central 
banks is ‘to maintain price stability.’58 The ESCB’s obligation to promote ‘the 
general economic policies in the Community’ (including growth) is without 
prejudice to price stability. From the outset, inflation was considered the 
primary enemy to be controlled by European monetary policy.  The fact that 
only monetary, not fiscal union, was agreed at Maastricht was made clear by 
Article 123 TFEU which stated that ‘Overdraft facilities or any other type of 
credit facility with the European Central Bank or the with the central banks of 
the Member States in favour of ….central governments, regional, local or 
other public authorities…shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly 
from them by the European Central Bank or national central banks of debt 
instruments.’  This was confirmed in Article 21 of the ECB Statute.59 This ‘no 
bail-out clause’ suggested there was to be no recourse to the independent 
central banking system by Member States to help them fund their primary 
debts.  The Commission had emphasized this limited role for the ECB in the 
design of the Euro to ensure fiscal discipline. The markets would have to be 
convinced that there would be no support: ‘Only an absolute “no bail-out” 
clause, prohibiting financial support not only from [the ECB], but also from the 
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Community as a whole, could persuade the markets that no solidarity 
measures can be expected.’60  
The original design of the ESCB reflects the narrow anti-inflationary 
goals of its designers. The modern sovereign national central bank is typified 
by in practice being a lender of last resort to both the private and the public 
sectors. It is able to do this because its ultimate source of funding is the 
monopoly power of taxation held by its sovereign state. The central bank 
cannot go bankrupt unless its state does so. It is given a guarantee of the 
highest kind, namely that of the nation’s taxing power.  This also works in 
reverse: a national bank can buy up unlimited amounts of public debt to 
guarantee solvency and liquidity of its government.61 The ECB by contrast 
was not officially a lender of last resort of to either private or public sectors.62 
In fact, it was barred from buying up their public debt. Furthermore, it 
remained reliant upon capital provided by its shareholders – the Member 
States - on a proportionate basis: there was no sovereign guarantee backed 
by Member States’ taxation systems to protect it from financial difficulty.63 
This was deliberate; the ECB was not a sovereign institution but rather a 
servant of its shareholders who had made only limited commitments to its 
finances. Independent national central banks, well-endowed with gold and 
other liquid assets, remained in existence as a reminder of Member States’ 
continued existence as independent states.  
 
Initial response to the Crisis: Unlimited Short-term Liquidity to the Private 
Sector 
 
The lessons of the Great Depression had been well-understood by most 
central bankers who saw that tight monetary policy to defend the gold 
standard was a key element in causing a recession to lurch into all-out 
depression in 1929-31.64 The fact that the initial burden of the crisis was felt 
by the private sector left the ECB with greater legal and political flexibility to 
use new methods to tackle the issue. There was little legal or economic 
controversy about the tools employed. The aim was to ensure that there was 
                                                 
60
 ‘One money, one market’ above, 111.  
61
 D Gros and C Alcidi, ‘Adjustment Difficulties and Debt Overhangs in the Eurozone Periphery’ 
(2011) CEPS Working Document 326/2011:’within the euro area, the usual assumption that public debt 
is risk-free does not hold. The reason is that no individual euro country has access to the printing press. 
The latter is what makes government debt risk-free in nominal terms in countries with their own 
currency. In this sense, in the peripheral euro area, public debt has more characteristics of private or 
perhaps “sub-sovereign” debt than of a risk-free security’, 1. 
62
 Consider  M Bordo and L Jonung, ‘The Future of EMU: What does the history of monetary unions 
tell us?’ in FH Capie and GE Wood, Monetary Unions: Theory, history, public choice, 2003, 
Routledge, London and New York.   
63
 See Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, Article 28 
where the original capital was set at a modest €5 billion and Article 33(2) ‘In the event of a loss 
incurred by the ECB, the shortfall may be offset against the general reserve fund of the ECB 
and…against the monetary income of the relevant financial year…’ 
64
 The Federal Reserve, no longer on gold, did not make the same mistake again and dramatically cut 
its main rate in early 2008 alongside providing open-ended liquidity. The ECB, historically more 
hawkish, remained more concerned about inflation and kept its main refinancing rate at twice that in 
the United States. Only when credit markets completely shut down following Lehman Brothers 
collapse in September 2008, did it make dramatic cuts in rates. 
 15 
no chain reaction of banking failures, including large numbers of Northern 
European banks under stress. 65  
The ECB thus had no hesitation in supporting private banks facing a 
frozen credit market throughout 2007-8.  It used both standard measures, 
cutting its main policy rate, and ‘non-standard’ measures, enhanced credit 
support in the form of loans of up one year and even outright purchases of 
bank debt securities. Regardless of the Maastricht Treaty scheme, the ECB 
can essentially create new money and loan this to banks or even buy assets 
outright. The only condition is that the assets provided in return be ‘eligible.’66 
It is here, in the arcane world of the ECB Guideline on Monetary Policy 
Instruments that the real power of the Bank to fight the economic crisis has 
been found. This is also the principal area where the ECB has been subject to 
accusations of abusing its legal mandate by socialising risk across all 
Eurozone members. Simply by means of agreeing to accept an asset as 
eligible, the Governing Council has come to wield the power of life or death 
over banking systems and thereby nations. As the crisis spread from banks in 
core countries outwards to the weaker periphery, the ECB has continued to 
accept collateral from Eurozone members viewed as increasingly insolvent, to 
back the creation of new money and debt. 
Initially this collateral backed long-term refinancing loans of up to one 
year. 67 This went well beyond the usual overnight or two-week loans that 
were the core of standard ECB monetary operations. Whilst primarily aimed at 
supporting private banks, the policy indirectly provided support to sovereign 
debts markets which were beginning to diverge.68 There was however no 
immediate question raised about the legality of the ECB acting as lender of 
last resort, particularly as core Eurozone members’ banks were caught up in 
the crisis too.  The ECB reassured the potential critics that the quality of the 
assets it had taken onto its balance sheet was sound and that there was little 
credit risk for its shareholder Member States. Indeed by summer 2009, the 
ECB President was already promising an exit strategy through winding down 
of the Bank’s liquidity support whilst urging Member States to similarly ‘return 
to sound, sustainable public finances’ and ‘prepare and communicate 
ambitious and realistic fiscal exit and consolidation strategies within the 
framework of the Stability and Growth Pact.’69 This chimed with the 
Commission’s recommencing procedures to restore the fiscal benchmarks of 
the Stability and Growth Pact across the Eurozone. 
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The Rolling Sovereign Debt Crisis – the ECB Crosses the Rubicon and 
Repents  
 
The fiscal position of the Member States had collapsed in 2008-9. Some 
Member States, like Greece, started out with very large stocks of public debt 
which rapidly became unsustainable when growth stopped.  By contrast, 
Ireland began the crisis with a small public debt but this exploded after a 
steep recession and state underwriting of its vast bad bank debts. In these 
countries private funding dried up for sovereigns and public debts could not 
be serviced. In May 2010 when the Greek had government asked for help 
from the EU and IMF, the ECB had become involved in the negotiations for 
reasons which were initially unclear; its mandate did not include structural 
reform packages. The answer came when the ECB revealed that it had 
agreed to buy Greek sovereign debt (at a large discount) on the secondary 
market due to ‘severe tensions in certain market segments’ which were 
‘hampering the monetary policy transmission mechanism.’  Its total purchases 
amounted to €40 billion. At the same time it announced that it was beginning 
a ‘Securities Market Programme’ to buy up securities rather than simply hold 
them as collateral to support loans to banks. 70 
 Were these actions lawful? The debt purchases were still made only on 
the secondary market, in compliance with the strict text of Article 123. The 
Governing Council did not however explain how the purchase of one Member 
State’s public debt contributed to the ECB’s primary remit of achieving price 
stability in the Eurozone. Of course, the risk of general depression, causing 
deflation rather than price stability, would have been a possible basis for such 
action. The ECB did not however say this: its intention appeared to be to 
support the Greek sovereign debt market in particular. The voting procedure 
in the Governing Council on this issue, as on most, is not weighted by capital 
contribution but rather proceeds by simple majority. 71Axel Weber and Jurgen 
Stark, the German members of the Council voted against the decision on the 
grounds that it was outside the ECB’s legal remit. The exact purpose of the 
purchases remains obscure but it was followed by later interventions to 
support Ireland and Portugal. In any event, the only method of legally 
challenging the ECB is through direct annulment proceedings. This is 
however up to the EU institutions and Member States who have privileged 
access.72 Any hint of such a legal challenge would of course bring financial 
chaos.   The ECB also relaxed the collateral rules so that banks could 
continue to obtain short-term credit by posting Greek (and later Irish and 
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Portuguese) sovereign debt even though the debt had been down-graded to 
junk status by ratings agencies.73 These steps helped to support the 
peripheral states public debt market in ways that were hard to reconcile with 
the ECB’s narrow remit, if not directly contrary to the law governing its 
powers.  
Having established the precedent, the ECB took similar steps by 
participating in bail-out packages in relation to first, Ireland, in November 
2010, and then, Portugal, in March 2011. The later resignations of both Stark 
and Weber from the Board were in protest against these ECB purchases of 
sovereign bonds. Most seriously, the ECB had itself come to have a big 
financial interest in collecting the payments due upon its high-risk sovereign 
debt portfolio which amounted to over €200 billion by end 2011.In addition, 
the ECB held as collateral large amounts of sovereign debt.74 The ECB has 
only limited capital and its own solvency was put at risk.75 It failed to secure 
any guarantees from the Member States against losses on these purchases 
which were not senior debt (unlike IMF loans which always rank first in any 
default). It had to ask for further capital injections in late 2010. The ECB has 
become vulnerable to losses on its portfolio and has thus resisted strongly 
suggestions that debt in peripheral countries be restructured, repeatedly 
emphasizing the need for countries to honour their debts and to make fiscal 
cuts.  This extended even to the Greek rescue packages, in which the Bank,  
whilst reluctantly accepting that private sector bond holders must bear losses, 
refused to accept any losses on its portfolio. 
The ECB’s growing worry about its own involvement in sovereign debt 
markets led to it press hard for Member States to put in place a clearer and 
permanent legal mechanism (beyond the EFSF) to make fiscal transfers to 
Eurozone members in difficulty. Alongside fears about the German 
constitutional court rejecting further bail-outs under the pre-existing Maastricht 
treaty, this drove the European Council to agree in December 2010 to amend 
the Article 136 TFEU to allow Eurozone members to establish ‘a stability 
mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the 
euro area as a whole.’76 This allowed for the creation of a permanent 
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European Stability Mechanism – the transfer fund due to replace the 
emergency EFSF in 2013.77 Although the ESM had real capital and a lending 
capacity of €500 billion it was still perceived by markets as inadequate to 
actually stabilize sovereign debt yields at low levels for larger Member States. 
Significantly, the ESM funds could only be accessed ‘subject to strict 
economic policy conditionality under a macro-economic adjustment 
programme.’78 There was no power for the ESM to simply buy up debt in the 
secondary market without strings attached, becoming a lender of last resort.79 
The core countries refused to allow it to be given a banking license so that it 
could borrow from the ECB to finance such a role.  
Eurozone leaders have always said Greece was a special case: its 
finances were so unsustainable that it needed both a bail-out and debt 
forgiveness which, although ‘voluntary’, imposed losses on private bond-
holders (ultimately amounting to 53% of their face value).  This was the first 
sovereign default in Europe since 1945.  The impossible tension has been 
that Eurozone rescue funds are designed both to reassure markets whilst also 
avoiding moral hazard for states seeking to limit austerity packages.  The 
imposition of conditionality immediately suggested that Member States 
needing support could no longer be trusted to run their own economies in 
ways compatible with the good of the Eurozone.  Rather than being victims of 
the global financial crisis, such States were to be increasingly being defined 
as delinquents who had authored their own down-fall. The creation of the 
ESM thus continued the uncertainty for both the peripheral governments and 
the ECB: there was to be no knock-out solution to drive down sovereign debt 
costs and reassure markets. This maintained the market pressure on the ECB 
to engage in more open-ended, but legally and politically unacceptable, 
support for public debt markets throughout 2011. 
 
The Eurozone Payments System: a stealth bail-out? 
 
Continuing the critique of the ECB, other commentators from Germany have 
suggested that a massive hidden bail-out has anyway occurred through the 
payments system of the Euro.80 The legality of this is not directly questioned 
but it is argued that a legal loophole allows peripheral countries access to 
unlimited funds through loans which pose risks for taxpayers in core 
countries. To understand the argument one needs to grasp the role of the 
European System of Central Banks in the ensuring that money flows securely 
through the European banking system.81 This obligation, ‘to promote the 
smooth operation of payments systems’ is set out in Article 105(2) TFEU. In 
practice the system requires the ESCB to ensure that payments against any 
authorised bank located anywhere in the Union clear regardless of the 
financial position of the host country. Confidence in the banking system 
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requires that there be no doubt that payments will be settled. This takes 
places ultimately through the national central banks transferring funds to meet 
commercial banks private payments obligations 
As an example, we can imagine a Greek consumer who buys a 
German car. The Greek consumer’s bank asks the Greek national bank to 
transfer the funds.  The Greek national bank then has a debit with the ECB.  
The Bundesbank then creates funds in the German seller’s bank. The 
Bundesbank has a credit for the same amount at the ECB. These accounting 
entries at the ECB are called TARGET282 balances. They are recorded as 
public exports of capital from Germany to Greece in balance of payments 
data. Before the crisis, such transfers of liquidity from the periphery to the 
core were largely re-financed by short-term bank loans from core countries.  
Thus, a current account deficit was matched by a capital account surplus. The 
TARGET2 accounts  then cancelled each other out.  
After the sovereign debt crisis took hold, the market for private credit to 
the periphery stopped amid fear over the safety of peripheral banks. These 
banks had to raise new reserves through borrowing at very low refinancing 
rates of around 1% from the ECB. As collateral, banks often provided the 
lowly-rated assets that the ECB has continued to accept. There was thus no 
obvious limit to the extent to which peripheral banks, and their citizens, could 
continue borrowing and lending regardless of their level of solvency.83 The 
TARGET2 system, which had previously shown few imbalances, assumed a 
new dimension. For example, by October 2011 the Bundesbank had €496 
billion (up from €25 billion in 2006) of credits at the ECB which largely 
matched the debits of the Irish, Spanish, Greek and Italian central banks. 
These vast in-flows were a mixture of capital flight, speculation and funding of 
current account deficits. The critics argue that these balances represent de 
facto forced loans to the periphery from Germany, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg, backed by nothing more than dubious collateral. This has been 
strenuously rejected by the ECB and the Bundesbank itself who argue that 
TARGET2 balances do not take the legal form of loans; rather they are merely 
accounting entries that reflect the pattern of cross-border private sector bank 
payments. The profits and losses from the operations of the ESCB are 
distributed between its Members based upon their capital contributions not 
their TARGET2 balances.84  
It is however true that if the ECB lost money because some of the 
assets it has acquired from the periphery turned bad, then the Eurozone 
members would have to recapitalize it in proportion to their shareholdings. 
Germany is the largest shareholder. If a Member State left altogether, the 
losses could be very large.  The system is thus socializing the risk of default 
across the Eurozone without using the official lending under the ESM.85 
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These sums are not obvious to taxpayers and do not appear on national debt 
figures. The deeper economic critique is however again that prices and wages 
were not allowed to adjust in the periphery. ‘A bit more courage to let the 
market processes run their course would have saved the ECB the huge 
problems posed by the stock of dubious collateral it now has to live with.’86 
The ECB has attempted ‘to intervene against market processes in an open-
ended fashion.’ It thereby prevented the collapse of the banking system but 
also ‘relieved these countries from having to push through the necessary 
domestic adjustments. Thus, Spain, Portugal and Greece were spared the 
need to start the necessary real devaluation by reducing wages and prices’ so 
that ‘there will be a dozen Mezzogiorni in Europe…permanently on the drip of 
the stronger regions…who will never get back on their feet again.’ 87 
If peripheral central banks had to clear their TARGET2 balances each 
year at the ECB by providing hard assets such as gold, these payments 
imbalances would not have been able to continue to grow as their central 
banks ran out of limited assets. 88  The cheap ESCB finance for their own 
commercial banks would have dried up and they would have to bear the very 
high market rate for borrowing. Many would be insolvent. Consumers would 
no longer be able to borrow at rates similar to those in Germany. The 
represents the Hayekian idea that loose central bank credit impedes maximal 
adjustment flexibility through market mechanisms. The classical gold standard 
adjustment process is being retarded. If this were accepted however then the 
single currency would cease to exist at all because euros would not all be of 
the same value as a means of exchange in all Member States.89 Speculators 
(along with all other actors) would then have even more incentive to move 
money out of weak regions anticipating de facto‘devaluation.’90 The design of 
the single currency had always implied that countries could not run out of 
money and that re-financing rates in the private sector would be equal across 
the eurozone. The reassertion of ‘national’ analyses of the balance of 
payments has been prompted by the perception in ‘creditor’ regions that there 
is an increasing risk of default and exit.  
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The Long-Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) – the ECB as Long-term 
Lender of Last Resort but only to the Private Sector 
 
The Greek crisis had continued on through 2011 as the first bail-out package 
had not restored fiscal sustainability. Greece still could not borrow on the 
market and faced insolvency in the absence of a second large loan. The ECB 
had bizarrely begun raising its main policy rate in summer 2011 in the belief 
that inflation was a risk. This made weak sovereigns weaker still, as investors 
worried about debt service.  With peripheral bond interest rates above 
nominal GDP growth, debt burdens were rising. By summer 2011 speculation 
had re-emerged within the single currency: instead of currencies, sovereign 
debts and banks were now the subject of short-selling and derivatives trading. 
Capital flight drove up borrowing costs and became a self-fulfilling spiral. The 
consequence of the Eurozone members having given up their central banks’ 
power to buy debt to control yields was becoming more apparent.91 The 
governments of Italy and Spain were put together with the insolvent Greek 
government in the minds of financial markets. The European Financial 
Stability Facility was not designed to underpin countries considered too big to 
save. Even domestic depositors in peripheral private banks began to move 
their money to safer banks in core countries. In effect a hidden bank run was 
in progress. 
A second credit squeeze was emerging in Europe, putting banks at 
severe liquidity risk. Whilst very short-term credit from the ECB could be 
realised, bank could not raise longer-term debt. Throughout this period the 
ECB came under increased pressure to directly buy Italian and Spanish public 
debt. Its continued refusal to countenance such action on legal grounds was 
questioned.92 When the new governor Mario Draghi took over, expectation 
increased that a public bond-buying programme would began in order to help 
governments directly. Draghi however played a careful game: he suggested 
that further ECB measures might emerge if politicians acted to establish ‘a 
new fiscal compact’ that would ‘enshrine the essence of fiscal rules and 
…ensure that the latter become fully credible, individually and collectively.’93 
He argued that ‘confidence works backwards: if there is an anchor in the long 
term, it is easier to maintain trust in the short term.’ In fact, there is also some 
suggestion that he had come to the view that resignations by German 
members of the ECB, demonstrating underlying German resistance, were 
serious reasons to limit further sovereign debt purchases.94   
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 A further, perhaps little known reason for urgency was the 
imbalances caused by the TARGET2 system. German banks had been using 
the flood of deposits from the periphery to pay off their central bank loans. By 
October 2011 the Bundesbank only had €21 billion of private securities (down 
from €224 billion in 2009). It refused to sell its remaining assets of gold and 
foreign reserves. Instead the Bundesbank had to borrow from banks to drain 
liquidity from the system and avoid importing inflation. Furthermore, from the 
ideal of a ‘hard’ currency backed by solid assets, the Bundesbank had only 
indefinitely increasing claims on TARGET2. Taxpayers and politicians worried 
about bearing potentially large losses on this vast indirect funding to the 
periphery. This threatened the whole Eurozone system and the ECB itself.  If 
the Bundesbank refused to accept TARGET2 inflows, the ECB would itself 
have to buy up assets from peripheral countries to ensure sufficient liquidity. 
Its small capital base would be threatened and it would in effect be creating 
new money in breach of its long-held commitment against such action.95  But 
a failure to do so would lead to the end of the Euro as a de facto exchange 
rate opened between, say, Greek Euros and those held in Germany. There 
was a need to try stem capital flight by supporting peripheral banks. 
 In November, Franco-German leaders openly considered if Greece 
should leave the Eurozone. The ECB President had questioned the ability of 
the Berlusconi government to institute the necessary austerity in Italy. 
Subsequently, Greece and Italy saw new technocratic governments appointed 
with austerity and reform agendas. After the European Council 8-9th  
December 2011 agreed a new fiscal compact treaty, the ECB acted by 
granting unlimited cheap loans to the European banking sector.96 This took a 
new form of three-year debt at only 1% with a very generous collateral 
requirement: peripheral government bonds were taken as all equally risk-free. 
The ECB had become the lender of first and last resort in the Eurozone 
banking system. Providing this highly unorthodox long-term bank funding 
skillfully respected the key German demand that there be no direct purchase 
of government debt. Nevertheless the loans invited domestic banks to buy 
their sovereign’s debts (yielding over 5-6% for Italy or Spain) and rebuild their 
capital. The LTRO programme was taken up on a vast scale (around €1 
trillion) by banks desperate for liquidity. Some of it appears to have gone into 
short-term sovereign debt purchases, particularly of the stronger Member 
States like Spain and Italy. This was the first programme launched by the 
ECB engaging in fresh deposit-creation - true ‘money printing’.97 This drew 
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the Bank far from the Maastricht ideal of a ‘responsible’ central focused only 
on price stability.  
The ECB rightly continued to deny that these actions amount to 
illegitimate monetary financing of public debt. 98 They were certainly legally 
within the ECB’s powers. Although its liquidity supply kept solvent 
governments from having to bail out their banks, the ECB has always refused 
to make any explicit promise to support sovereigns. This is based not just 
upon a fear about the legality of such a commitment. The ECB’s senior 
officials appear reluctant to relieve the pressure on deficit governments.  The 
ambiguous stance of the ECB, along with the limited and conditional bail-out 
funds through the EFSF and EFSM maintained maximum political pressure 
upon the Member States to instigate serious austerity and structural reform. 
However, LTRO itself has attracted further criticism from the Bundesbank 
whose President argued that the relaxation of collateral rules meant that 
insolvent peripheral banks were being spared bankruptcy and restructuring.99 
The scale of insolvency within the European banking sector remains unclear 
given the volume of emergency support.100 The message was clear: in the 
end, economic pain must be imposed upon the periphery and the ECB should 
not seek to delay this indefinitely with ‘non-standard’ measures based upon 
loose interpretations of adequate collateral.  
The reality is that the ECB was faced with a second liquidity crisis and 
a sovereign debt crisis which were mutually reinforcing. The LTRO sought to 
stem the banking crisis, whilst the fiscal compact was supposed to provide 
assurances that a long-term path to debt sustainability was in hand. This was 
nothing like a true lender of last resort commitment and it is clear that a crucial 
collapse in the market for sovereign debt in Europe can be dated to this 
period. Foreign investors were faced with default and exit risks that were no 
longer negligible.  Furthermore, the holders of Greek public debt had been 
twice forced into large write-downs in order to protect official lenders like the 
ECB and EFSF from any losses on their loans. This precedent suggested that 
future bail-outs might lead to further heavy private sector losses on other 
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sovereign debts.101  The risk-free assets in Europe had narrowed to the 
government bonds of Northern surplus countries. Ironically, the failure by the 
ECB or the Eurozone members, on legal and political grounds, to cap 
sovereign debt costs explicitly for Italy and Spain raises the cost of future 
rescue packages and deepens the austerity needed to pay interest bills. 102 
 
The Increased Political Power of the ECB as an Agent of Restructuring 
Programmes and Fiscal Discipline 
 
 The ambiguous nature of its legal powers and intentions has allowed 
the ECB to play a complex game of economic bluff with other EU actors and 
Member States. Following the LTRO programme and the TARGET2 loans, 
the ECB has been emerging as the most important creditor in the Eurozone. 
Thus, even though it has not directly provided funds to Member States, the 
ECB has become heavily involved in approving and monitoring the fiscal and 
socio-economic restructuring of debtor countries.  This occurs through its 
membership, along with the Commission and the IMF, of the so-called 
‘Troika’, an ad hoc grouping that is not known to European law and has no 
institutional basis, democratic transparency nor legal framework.  This 
process has been entwined with the EU’s broader economic governance 
moving towards a tougher legal enforcement of the fiscal compact. The ECB 
has persistently told the Eurozone members that it considers only strong fiscal 
discipline can bring an end to the crisis.103  
  On the broader question of economic governance, the ECB has 
pushed hard for strict new legal procedures to enforce budgetary control. 
Thus in response to the EU Council’s proposed new regulation on the 
excessive deficit procedure, in February 2011, the ECB argued for a tougher 
regime saying that ‘the current crisis has demonstrated very clearly that 
ambitious reform to the economic governance framework is in the profound 
and overwhelming interest of the European Union.’ This would entail a 
‘quantum leap in the surveillance of the euro area, which the ECB deems 
necessary to ensure its stability and smooth functioning.’ The Commission 
proposal was attacked because penalties were insufficiency automatic and 
there were too many escape clauses. At that time, the ECB recommended a 
further Treaty to strengthen economic governance.104 Important actors at the 
ECB have repeatedly asserted, without much evidence, that weak legal 
powers to enforce public debt rules had been an important cause of the crisis. 
It was argued that merely continuing with modified tools set up under the 
Stability and Growth Pact would not ensure ‘a credible institutional framework 
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for both a return to sound public finances and the smooth functioning of 
EMU.’105 This would entail that countries ‘must agree to give up sovereignty 
over macro-fiscal objectives (notably as regards governments deficits and 
debts)’ but that Member States remain responsible for their own financial 
obligations. The changes to national law could include the introduction of 
balanced budget laws requiring overspends to be paid in the following year 
into an account. The ECB has thereby increased its influence over the shape 
of the EU economy as a whole but has compromised its independence and 
legal mandate as a tool of price stability.106 Such interventions however ‘bring 
the bank on to political ground, very far from its traditional technocratic set-
up.’107  
 
Budgetary Discipline not Fiscal Union as the New Eurozone Constitution 
 
The death of the Stability and Growth Pact in 2005 had appeared to be 
inevitable: it recognised that to impose a rigid budgetary system on a diverse 
group of countries without fiscal co-ordination and a uniform interest rate was 
neither economically sensible nor politically possible. There was a final 
flourish in which the EU, along with the G20, approved a co-ordinated deficit-
led fiscal stimulus in late 2008. Since then sovereign debt problems have 
pushed the SGP back into a central position in EU legal order. The EU has 
set out on a course of ever greater legal control over Member States’ budgets. 
Indeed fiscal discipline was already back on the agenda as early as March 
2009 when the Commission began excessive deficit procedures against most 
Member States. 108 These procedures currently will remain until 2013 and set 
demanding targets deficit reductions in order to meet the 3% target by then.109 
By September 2010 the Commission had proposed toughening the SGP.110  
These proposals were eventually passed in September 2011. They reinforce 
the original Stability and Growth Pact in a recast ‘six pack’ of Regulations on 
economic governance.111 The most significant change was to set binding 
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annual adjustments downward of at least 0.5% in the deficit and 1/20th of 
amount the stock of debt exceeding 60%.112  Where the Commission 
recommends fines, these are automatically imposed unless the Council 
rejects them by a qualified majority.113  
Despite these attempts to reassure markets that binding fiscal laws 
were being re-established, as we saw, the crisis intensified in summer 2011 
as contagion spread to the crucial market for Italian and Spanish sovereign 
debts. The ECB had hinted that further action by it was dependent upon even 
deeper legal guarantees of fiscal discipline. The core countries in the 
Eurozone felt that the commitment to fiscal discipline needed to be enshrined 
in higher law, through a fresh treaty. Germany had always wanted there to be 
greater ‘automaticity’ of sanctions in the original SGP and a debt-brake 
enshrined in national law.114 As we saw above, the European Council agreed 
to sign this new ‘fiscal compact’ in December 2011.   
Regardless of the great publicity and value attached to it, the Fiscal 
Compact is largely devoid of legal or practical importance; it does not 
significantly change the key targets already set out in the ‘six-pack.’ The main 
new feature is that it ‘constitutionalizes’ fiscal commitments in Treaty-form and 
requires them to be given similar status in national law. The most important 
additional economic rule is that the ‘budgetary position of the general 
government shall be balanced or in surplus.’(Art 3) This is the new ‘golden 
rule’, defined as a ‘structural’ deficit of less than 0.5%. This represents the 
underlying deficit when the economy is adjusted for its position on the 
business cycle. There is however no definitive understanding amongst 
economists of what this figure is. It will be negotiated for each country with the 
Commission. For States whose stock of public debt is below 60%, a structural 
deficit of 1% is allowed. The 0.5% limit is an ultimate target, beyond each 
Member States’ existing medium term objectives under the SGP and the 3% 
Maastricht target. Thus Eurozone members will in principle have to remove 
their present structural deficits which average about 4% of GDP, although the 
present depressed conditions will justify delay.115  
The deeper integration of fiscal discipline into national democratic life is 
required as the pact must be implemented in national law ‘through provisions 
of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or 
otherwise guaranteed to be respected throughout the national budgetary 
processes.’ (Art 3(2)) The aim is to avoid any domestic distributional disputes 
derailing the facts of fiscal adjustment. Parliamentary processes must be 
ultimately made subject to the balanced budget commitment. The European 
Court has jurisdiction to ensure this measure is correctly implemented. Where 
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any significant deviation from the path towards the medium term objective 
occurs ‘a correction mechanism shall be triggered automatically.’ (Art 3(1)(e)) 
This is an attempt to get back to the classical gold standard 
mechanism of automatic ex-ante budgetary constriction by governments. To 
this extent it largely ignores the reality of modern social democracy in Europe.  
The Commission is already finding it impossible to get Member States to 
implement the adjustment programmes that were agreed in 2009 given the 
recession in the Eurozone.116 To cut the stock of debt to 60% requires running 
budget surpluses for perhaps two decades.117  Debt levels are presently rising 
towards an average 90% of GDP. Countries like Italy and Spain, with interest 
rates at 5-6% and no growth must run government surpluses of 4-5% to stop 
debt escalating. It is difficult to see when progress along the path laid down in 
the Fiscal Compact might begin.118  Only the small Baltic republics have 
achieved such dramatic cuts since the crisis began.119 The Eurozone began 
falling back into recession in 2012 and even conservative economic opinion 
from ratings agencies to international bodies questioned whether further 
deficit cuts might be difficult to implement.120  Unemployment rose across the 
Eurozone from 7% in 2007 to 10.8% in 2012 but this concealed big variations: 
Spain (23.6%), Greece (21%) and Ireland (14.7%) reached record highs 
whilst Germany saw its rate fall to 5.7%.121  
Much economic opinion on the new Treaty thus suggests that 
adherence to the Fiscal Compact will lead to a prolonged period of recession 
in much of the Eurozone.122 There will be on-going and bitter negotiations with 
DG Economic and Financial Affairs as to the pace and nature of fiscal 
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contraction. Breaches may see automatic penalties unless several larger 
states block them. The process will be extremely damaging politically. Larger 
states may be reluctantly forced to use the European Stability Mechanism 
with the attendant loss of sovereignty measured in compulsory spending cuts, 
tax rises, privatisation and liberalization being imposed.  
  The economic arguments of principle for some fiscal transfers 
within a single currency area are well-understood. 123 There is however no 
prospect of even shared debt issuance alongside a more democratic and 
open process of Eurozone-wide budget setting. This would represent a move 
towards political union.  Instead, the funding mechanism and conditionality 
under the EFSF and the ESM will continue to be controlled by small numbers 
of officials and politicians drawn from creditor states, the Commission and the 
ECB. The European Commission has floated the idea of ‘stability’ bonds.124 
The German Council of Economic Experts has itself spoken of the need for 
longer-term debt refinancing at lower rates that presently on offer. It 
suggested the idea of ‘redemption bonds’ that would be temporary but spread 
over 25 years and cover up to 60% of debt to GDP. These ideas have been 
rejected by creditor nations. 
 Officials at the ECB have suggested that sequencing matters: the 
establishing of strict fiscal discipline might lead to consideration of further 
political integration. Certainly the few remaining triple-A rated Northern 
European nations will be very reluctant to endanger this status. It is clear that 
there no contemplation of moving to shared fiscal burdens without taking 
direct controls over national budget-setting.   As Jurgen Stark put it ‘only with 
a fundamental shift in our structures of in the European Union – towards a 
real political union – could one conceivably create incentive and governance 
conditions that are commensurate with the issuance of common bonds.’125 
There is however no sense in which a true political union is seen as essential: 
‘There is no need to have a single budgetary policy in the euro area. No need 
for a so-called transfer union.’126 For Eurozone members facing an uncertain 
period of austerity however, the possibility of default whilst remaining within or 
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of exiting the single currency will begin to be considered.127 Indeed, perhaps 
the most pressing unresolved issue remains that of devising a legal 
framework to allow a Member State to leave the Eurozone.128  
 
The Evolving Policy Framework: From the Instability of Law to the Instability of 
Politics 
 
During the first period of the crisis 2007-9, when the problems were 
most acute in the private debt markets, the Eurozone system apparently 
managed well. The ECB was able to act flexibility to make credit available to 
banks. Since 2010, attention has focused upon public debt markets.  Driven 
by fear, rather than a desire for closer union, the Eurozone eventually created 
highly discretionary funds with strict conditions and high interest rates. These 
funds will be dispensed, in an opaque manner, by the European Stability 
Mechanism in conjunction with the ECB. Throughout this period the ECB has 
provided large volumes of liquidity and shifted private assets onto the public 
balance sheet without democratic approval.  
 Thus far in fact, the crisis has produced a shift away from law and 
legal systems, embodying the equality of Member States, towards national 
politics and fear as the driving force within the Eurozone. The more powerful 
Member States and the European Central Bank, supported by the 
International Monetary Fund, have begun to direct economic reform 
programmes in faltering Member States largely outside the legal framework of 
the EU Treaties. The single market system enforced by the European 
Commission and private actors has been judged to have failed to deliver 
stability. This new system of power politics at the heart of the Eurozone 
represents a significant shift away from the rule of law that has dominated the 
single market hitherto.129 Thus democratic debate in the Council and 
Parliament on liberalisation, enforcement of single market rules by the 
Commission or private actors before the Court of Justice, the doctrines of 
proportionality and careful balancing of social and economic objectives will no 
longer apply to weaker states faced with severe budgetary problems; instead, 
structural reform, regardless of its necessity or appropriateness under EU law, 
will be imposed by creditors. 
 A new kind of discretionary political architecture has replaced aspects 
of the old legal order.  The weaker Member States will continue on, not as 
equal sovereigns, but as dependents. This was neither legally nor 
economically inevitable. Clearly Maastricht did not create an EU fiscal funding 
mechanism, but the European Central Bank’s legal remit was not without a 
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flexibility that could have been employed to support solvent Member States, 
particularly Spain and Italy, facing liquidity problems. It could have made 
commitments to buy up debt in the secondary market without breaching any 
explicit provision of the Treaty. Indeed the prospect of this has been 
constantly hinted at as a deus ex machina that could be employed in 
extremis. Whilst citing legal limitations on bond purchases, senior ECB 
officials have repeatedly endorsed the economic model of austerity, probably 
to reassure Northern European leaders but also because they genuinely 
support it on ideological grounds.  
 
The Gold Standard Debate Replayed: Law, Politics and Market Mechanisms 
 
The search for solutions to the crisis repeats many of the debates that 
were seen during the 1930s around the gold standard and Great Depression. 
The debate between Keynes and Hayek is well-documented. The former 
argued that, unlike in a standard business cycle, general deflation led to 
worsening indebtedness and real wage cuts were very difficult to achieve in 
social democracies. The latter argued that loose central bank credit had 
created a boom/bust and that only liquidation and deflation could correct 
this.130 Modern-day liberal thinking finds echoes in the EU treaty’s legal 
framework: there should be no bail-out of insolvent sovereigns or banks by 
the Eurozone members or the ECB. This underpins a modern-day gold 
standard philosophy about the way the single market can and should operate. 
The legal rules of the game are set in advance by (a) adherence to free trade 
as embodied in the four fundamental freedoms allied to (b) a stable currency 
which is underpinned by strict fiscal discipline. If legal and currency stability is 
maintained this way, then markets will clear through adjustments in the prices 
for credit, labour, goods and services. On this view, resolution of the crisis lies 
in reaffirming the rules of the game. This reflects strong liberal strands in 
German economic thought.131 Both social market economists and the more 
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laissez-faire ordo-liberal school focus upon legal certainty as a crucial to 
capitalism. Whilst the social market perspective goes further and see supply-
side reforms as important to growth, neither perspective sees a significant role 
for demand management.  
At first glance, in political terms, this view seems to lead to the 
conclusion that the original design of the Maastricht treaty was largely 
adequate. There should be no need for any closer political union within the 
Eurozone, for example, to allow for the issue of common public debt or direct 
welfare transfers to governments.132 At a more populist level, this has been 
fed by an understandable narrative that Northern Europe’s surplus countries 
should not be ‘punished’ for their success by permanently supporting the 
indebted South. ‘Moral hazard’ in the economic sphere must be avoided; bail-
outs only encourage further misbehaviour and higher costs in the future. In 
short: the EU is not a sovereign country, but it does not need such closer 
political union to have a stable functioning economy with a single currency. 
However there are still strong strands within German thinking that argue that 
closer control over economic policy is actually essential for monetary union to 
really work. This was the original view of the Bundesbank and Helmut Kohl in 
the period before Maastricht. In short, the longer-term German vision may be 
that of a political union with a joint treasury and joint liability but only after 
budgets have been brought into balance by countries that can be trusted. 
 In the Keynesian view, there was over-reliance upon markets to correct 
all imbalances and an under-regulated market for capital and credit. The role 
of excessive public debt is viewed as less significant, apart from in the case of 
Greece. 133  On this account, the single currency locked in and increased 
trade imbalances in the Eurozone which arose from excessive savings from 
Northern European being recycled into trade deficits in the periphery in a kind 
of vendor finance scheme. The largely unregulated single market in finance, 
rather than leading to stability, created a ticking time-bomb at the heart of the 
EU. Capital flight from the periphery then took hold in both private and public 
debt-markets. This created a balance of payments problem (now seen 
through TARGET2) and a recession. A sensible path for adjustment is 
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primarily through the periphery increasing exports and reducing imports. 134 
Using austerity alone to drive down wages is very difficult. Sharing the burden 
by raising demand and inflation in surplus countries is key. The reason why 
the gold standard collapsed was because this adjustment was imposed on 
debtor/deficit countries rather than shared with creditor/surplus countries. The 
ECB has co-ordinated continued liquidity but the process of trade adjustment 
has barely begun. 
   
Restructuring or Rebalancing the European Economy? 
 
Thus from a Keynesian perspective, a balance of payments compact is 
needed rather more than a fiscal compact. The Euro appeared to abolish the 
balance of payments as an issue for Eurozone members. Now however it is 
clear that imbalances were simply masked.135 What in the past would have 
been adjusted by currency realignment, is instead being imposed by legally 
binding fiscal tightening. A legal system to balance trade was first proposed 
on a global scale by Keynes in his 1943 suggestion to create an International 
Clearing Union.136 Mindful of the problems of the gold standard, he noted the 
lack of symmetry between countries faced with trade imbalances: surplus 
countries could stockpile reserves indefinitely whilst deficit countries had to 
bear the whole burden of adjustment by austerity. One answer was to legally 
require both surplus and deficit countries to adjust by a system of pressure 
and fines. 
  The European Union already has the basis for such a system through 
TARGET2 payments.  However under the current rules do not prevent either 
infinite excess deficits or surpluses.137  The reason Keynes’ plan was rejected 
by the United States was that under his system countries were obliged to fund 
deficit countries to a considerable extent and also to inflate their economies to 
raise imports.  As we have seen, Northern European surplus countries have 
now come to see TARGET2 as a forced loan of nearly €800 billion to the 
periphery. Their trade surplus is seen as a virtue derived from superior skills, 
thrift, efficiency, wage-restraint on so forth, whilst the periphery’s deficit is 
viewed as indicative of vice, profligacy, debt-driven consumption, lack of wage 
discipline and poor governance. Given this political and moral 
characterisation, it is clear why public funds have been given reluctantly and 
are tied to supply-side reforms.138    
The question raised for Europe now is similar to that put in response to 
Keynes: is Europe in a 1945 moment or a 1929 moment? The former was a 
time of reconstruction when the surplus country, the United States, was happy 
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to fund long-term development in Europe through the Marshall Plan, but only 
if it had control over the process. The latter was a time of general economic 
depression which government could alleviate through raising demand.139 The 
situation amongst contemporary European countries displays elements of 
both problems. Greece is clearly in need of fundamental restructuring in 
important respects if it is to be part of the single currency.140 The Eurogroup 
suggestion of a ‘reconstruction commissioner’ for Greece is indicative of the 
break-down in governance and trust. Ireland by contrast is seen as a very 
open and flexible economy which always followed the liberal market approach 
advocated by the Commission. It required a bail-out because it guaranteed its 
banking sector’s debts. Despite faithful implementation of its adjustment 
programme, it may need further support.141 Italy and Spain exhibit a confusing 
mixture of both elements: they have some dynamic export sectors but now 
depend upon capital funding from Northern Europe through the ECB to keep 
their banks from insolvency.  They also exhibit, to varying degrees, long-
standing structural problems that impede growth and competitiveness. 
Expansion of demand in surplus countries would help all Eurozone members 
to develop exports and grow. 
Taking the opportunity to use their capacity as creditors, the surplus 
countries, Commission and the ECB are seeking to push through long-
cherished reforms aimed at liberalisation and restructuring that go back to the 
Lisbon agenda and before.142 These reforms could not be pushed through 
using EU single market harmonisation nor through soft law and domestic 
democratic processes. Now the reforms will emerge through conditionality 
and excessive deficit procedures. It is hinted that, once adequate progress is 
made, then wider political union may be considered. But long-term austerity is 
the very opposite of a reconstruction plan. It is doubtful whether such a 
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programme can be sustained for long.143 It is not even certain that structural 
reforms will actually deliver adequate growth because not all Eurozone 
members can have trade surpluses with each other. The German model of 
export-led growth arithmetically requires other countries to be in trade deficit.  
In the end, the economics suggest that rebalancing must come from 
both higher growth and inflation in trade surplus countries alongside socially 
containable austerity in deficit countries.144 A pan-European bank resolution 
system and funding for recapitalization will also be required.145  The level of 
austerity required should be made bearable by restructuring debt where it is 
not sustainable (cases of de facto insolvency) and capping bond yields by 
using the ESM as a true lender of last resort to support countries that are 
solvent but facing loss of market confidence.146  None of this is however likely 
to come in the form of new formal legal commitments but rather will emerge 
from necessary political compromises.147 
 
Conclusions 
 
The legal structure set up at Maastricht has clearly failed.  The designers of 
the Maastricht treaty sought to legally insulate themselves against both 
inflation and fiscal transfers. In the end this proved impossible. The problem 
developed in bank credit markets that funded trade imbalances which were 
not corrected by fiscal or other governance measures. It was believed that 
capital markets would discipline countries and banks. In fact, markets seemed 
to have found the single currency too credible: it was assumed (correctly as it 
turned out) there was an implicit commitment to prevent any sovereign default 
or exit. The levels of public debt only rose dramatically as a consequence of 
the collapse in the private sector. Fiscal policy was not the immediate cause 
of the crisis. Since the sovereign debt markets began to fail in 2010, fear of a 
second financial disaster has led to improvised legal and quasi-legal action to 
prevent sovereign default. The longer-term solution lies in resolving which 
legal and economic model the Eurozone wishes to follow.  
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We can return to the problems of credibility and co-operation identified 
by Eichengreen in relation to the gold standard. On one side, we can see the 
liberal school, who argue that whilst private markets prompted the crisis, the 
use of large-scale public debt and cheap ECB liquidity has worsened the 
problems and delayed painful reforms. Credibility must be restored through 
the fiscal and monetary discipline of a stronger legal framework. The 
Eurozone can then rebalance through market adjustments in wages and 
prices in weaker regions. The ECB must be stopped from printing money 
backed by poor assets and move closer to a gold-standard adjustment 
system. This might entail default and exit for some. On the other side, are the 
new Keynesians who argue that the solution lies in closer fiscal co-operation 
through increasing growth in surplus countries to reverse trade imbalances.  
This must involve higher inflation in core countries. The difficulty of achieving 
internal devaluations within the periphery is too great. The risk of years of 
austerity leading to further defaults and possible exits from the Euro is real. 
PolyaniPolanyi’s point that social democracy is largely incompatible with fully 
flexible markets is still true. Political leaders will struggle to overcome serious 
social unrest to radically restructure social democracies.148  
The politics and power balance have so far seen Northern European 
states follow the liberal economic approach. They have refused to create a 
lender of last resort to restore market confidence in Eurozone sovereigns. 
Rather, strict conditionality and modest fresh loans have been offered. Crisis 
has come to be seen as an instrumental part of the unfinished liberalization 
process. This approach aims: first, to allow as much capital repatriation by 
Northern banks as possible, second, to convince debt markets that core 
Eurozone members will be solvent in the longer term; third, to convince 
electorates in the stronger states that they will not have to bail-out or 
subsidize the public spending of other EU states indefinitely; fourth, to 
facilitate more direct control over the economic and social decisions of weaker 
Member States and; fifth, if possible, to produce the real wage reductions 
necessary to eliminate trade deficits.  
The most important EU player in the crisis has been the ECB. It has 
been able to use the legal ambiguity of its remit to maintain the single 
currency whilst imposing its own liberal political and economic agenda. The 
Bank has drawn a sharp distinction between states and private actors. It has  
maintained adherence to the German view of the Maastricht settlement by not 
funding public deficits. Its direct public debt purchases were limited and then 
stopped. It successfully advocated for two broader objectives: the re-
establishing of a truly constitutional commitment to ‘sound public finances’ 
and the establishment of a bail-out fund with strict conditionality.  It has thus 
refused to be a lender of last resort to sovereigns, who can therefore only 
meet losses in market confidence with fiscal tightening. For private actors, by 
contrast, the ECB has however avoided the tight money policy of the gold 
standard by providing vast liquidity. Critics argue that this distinction between 
sovereigns and private debtors is not tenable. For liberal gold standard 
advocates, private liquidity provision has merely delayed bank insolvencies, 
impeded adjustment in the periphery and indirectly exposed Northern 
                                                 
148
 J Ponticelli and H-J Voth, ‘Austerity and anarchy: Budget Cuts and Social Unrest in Europe, 1919-
2009’ (2011) CEPR Discussion Paper Series No.8513. 
 36 
European taxpayers to risky assets. On the other side, Keynesian critics say 
that the failure to cap sovereign debt yields for solvent Member States 
weakens peripheral banks and necessitates levels of austerity that lack 
credibility with markets. 
The question remains: will this any of this ultimately lead to full fiscal 
union? Certainly fear of default by peripheral states is not a good basis for 
deeper union. The lack of trust on all sides is great. The willingness to pool 
sovereignty further in a common treasury and debt issuance seems very 
limited. To avoid a financial disaster - which would undoubtedly spread to core 
countries -  the short-term palliative of bail-out funds, whether directly through 
the ESM or indirectly through the ECB, will continue along with longer-term 
structural reform. The loss of fiscal, social and economic policy autonomy will 
be large.  This may become intolerable, prompting further debt restructuring 
and even exit from the Euro in some cases. It is possible also that core 
countries may choose to leave if the burden of transfers is seen to be too 
large. The Eurozone has yet to find a stable legal and economic framework 
that will guarantee the future of the single currency in its present form. 
 
